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Economy-Related Emotional Attitudes Towards
Other People: How Can We Explain Them?
Christopher Reyes, Vladik Kreinovich, and Chon Van Le

Abstract Research has shown that to properly understand people’s economic behavior, it is important to take into account their emotional attitudes towards each other.
Behavioral economics shows that different attitudes results in different economyrelated behavior. A natural question is: where do these emotional attitudes come
from? We show that, in principle, such emotions can be explained by people’s objective functions. Specifically, we show it on the example of a person whose main
objective is to increase his/her country’s GDP: in this case, the corresponding optimization problem leads exactly to natural emotions towards people who contribute
a lot or a little towards this objective.

1 Formulation of the Problem
Economy-related emotions are important. Traditional economics considers people as rational decision makers, that make all investment and other economic decisions based on the cold calculations of possible benefits and drawbacks of different
options. In reality, people often have strong economy-related emotions, and these
emotions affect human decisions. It is therefore important to take these emotions
into account when predicting how people will behave.
Taking such emotions into account is an important part of behavioral economics,
a branch of economics that recently got several Nobel prizes.
But where do these emotions come from? A natural next question is: where do
these emotions come from? These emotions affect how people make economic deChristopher Reyes and Vladik Kreinovich
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cisions and thus, affect the country’s economy. So, if a person wants the country’s
economy to be going in a certain direction, a natural hypothesis is that this person’s
economy-related emotions should help drive the country’s economy in this direction.
In this paper, we show that this hypothesis indeed explains – at least on the qualitative level – people’s economy-related emotions. We show it on the example of a
situation when a person is mostly interested in increasing the country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as much as possible. We show that in this case, the analysis
of the corresponding optimization problem leads exactly to the economy-related
emotional attitudes that people experience.

2 Towards Formulating the Problem in Precise Terms
How decision theory describes individual and group decision making. According to decision theory (see, e.g., [2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 10]), decisions of a rational person i,
i.e., a person whose decisions are consistent, are equivalent to optimizing an appropriate function ui (x) known as utility function. In other words, decisions of a rational
person i are equivalent to selecting an alternative x for which the utility ui (x) is the
largest possible.
In general, utility is defined modulo linear transformations: instead of the original
function ui (x), we can use an alternative function u′i (x) = a · ui (x) + bi for some
constants ai > 0 and bi ; this new function describes exactly the same preferences
and thus, exactly the same economic behavior.
What if several people need to make a joint decision affecting all of them? In
this paper, we consider a what is called a win-win situation, when we need to select
between several decisions each of which is potentially beneficial for everyone. In
such cases, we start with what is called a status quo situation x0 – the situation
in which the group is right now (and in which the group will remain if no group
decision is selected). In this case, to make analysis easier, it makes sense to re-scale
all individual utilities so that each person utility ui (x0 ) of the status quo situation
x0 becomes 0. This can be done, e.g., by going from the original scale ui (x) to the
new scale ui (x) + bi with bi = −ui (x0 ). Because of this possibility, in the following
text, we will assume that all utility functions already have this property, i.e., that
ui (x0 ) = 0 for all participants i.
Under this assumption, decision theory recommends to select a decision x for
n

which the product of the utilities ∏ ui (x) is the largest possible. This idea is known
i=1

as Nash’s bargaining solution; see, e.g., [5, 6, 7].
How emotional attitudes towards other people are taken into account. Emotional attitude means that the person’s preferences – and thus, the person’s utility
function ui (x) that describes these preferences – are affected not only by the objective conditions of this person, but also by the conditions (i.e., utilities) of others. Let
(0)
us denote the utility that only takes into account the objective conditions by ui (x).
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(0)

The actual utility ui (x) is affected not only by this value ui (x), but also by utilities
u j (x) of others:
(0)
ui (x) = fi (ui (x), u j (x), u j′ (x), . . .).
The effect of others is usually smaller than the effect of the person’s own objective
conditions. Since the effect of the values u j (x) is small, we can follow the usual
practice of physics and other applications (see, e.g., [1, 11]): expand the dependence
on these values in Taylor series and keep only linear terms in this expansion. So, we
end up with the following formula:
(0)

ui (x) = ui (x) + ∑ αi j · u j (x),

(1)

j̸=i

for appropriate coefficients αi j . These coefficients αi j , in effect, describe the emotions of the i-th person toward a person j:
• When the coefficient αi j is positive, this means positive attitude: the person i
feels better when he/she knows that the person j is better.
• When the coefficient αi j is negative, this means negative attitude: the more person j enjoys life, the worse person i feels. This negative feeling may be welljustified: e.g., when the person j gained his money in a still-legal but highly
unethical way, by hurting others.
Resulting formulation of the problem. Suppose that a person i wants the community to achieve a certain objective – e.g., to increase the overall GDP which can be
approximately described as sum
def (0)

G = ui + ∑ u j .

(2)

j̸=i

The person i can change the group behavior by using appropriate emotions toward other people. Indeed, once the person i fixes his/her emotions, i.e., the coefficients αi j , then, according to the Nash’s bargaining solution, the group will select
the alternative that maximizes the product
!
def

F=

(0)

ui + ∑ αi j · u j · ∏ u j .
j̸=i

(3)

j̸=i

The question is: what coefficients αi j should the person i select so that the result
of maximizing the expression (4) will also maximize i-th objective G – e.g., in our
example, the expression (2).
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3 Analysis of the Problem
Let us first formulate the above problem in general mathematical terms. We have two
functions F(v1 , . . . , vn ) and G(v1 , . . . , vn ) of several variables. We want to make sure
that at the point m = (m1 , . . . , mn ) at which the first function attains its maximum
under some constraints, the second function also attains its largest value under the
same constraints.
The fact that at the point m, the function F(v1 , . . . , vn ) attains its maximum under
give constraints means that for any perturbation mi 7→ mi + ∆ mi which is consistent
with these constraints, the value of this function cannot increase. In particular, this
must be true for small perturbations ∆ mi . For small perturbations, terms quadratic
(and of higher order) with respect to these perturbations are very small and can, thus,
be safely ignored. Thus, to find the modified value F(m1 + ∆ m1 , . . . , mn + ∆ mn ) of
this function, we can expand this expression in Taylor series in terms of ∆ mi and
keep only linear terms in this expansion. In this case, we get
n

∂F
· ∆ mi .
i=1 ∂ mi

F(m1 + ∆ m1 , . . . , mn + ∆ mn ) = F(m1 , . . . , mn ) + ∑

(4)

Thus, the requirement that the value of the function F(v1 , . . . , vn ) attains its maximum means that for all possible perturbations ∆ mi , the new value
F(m1 + ∆ m1 , . . . , mn + ∆ mn )
of this function is smaller than or equal to the previous value F(m1 , . . . , mn ). Due to
the formula (4), this difference is equal to the sum in the right-hand side of this formula. Thus, the maximizing condition means that this sum should be non-positive:
n

∂F

∑ ∂ mi · ∆ mi ≤ 0.

(5)

i=1

This sum is the scalar (“dot”) product ∇F · ∆ m of two vectors: the gradient vector


∂F
∂F
∇F =
,...,
(6)
∂ mi
∂ mn
and the perturbations vector
∆ m = (∆ m1 , . . . , ∆ mn ).

(7)

Thus, the fact that the function F(v1 , . . . , vn ) attains its maximum at the point m
implies that for all possible perturbations ∆ m, we have ∇F · ∆ m ≤ 0.
The fact that at the same point m, the function G should not increase means that
∆ G · ∆ m ≤ 0. We do not exactly know a priori which perturbations ∆ m will be
possible and which not. So, to make sure that the maximum of F also implies the
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maximum of G, it is reasonable to require that for all possible vectors ∆ m, if we
have ∇F · ∆ m ≤ 0, then we should also have ∇G · ∆ m ≤ 0.
In particular, if ∇F · ∆ m = 0, this means that we have both ∇F · ∆ m ≤ 0 and
∇F · (−∆ m) ≤ 0. Thus, we should have ∇G · ∆ m ≤ 0 and ∇G · (−∆ m) ≤ 0 – i.e.,
∇G · ∆ m ≥ 0. So, we should have ∇G · ∆ m = 0. In geometric terms, the fact that the
dot product of two vectors is 0 means that this vectors are orthogonal to each other.
Thus, every vector ∆ m which is orthogonal to ∇F should be orthogonal to ∇G. All
the vectors orthogonal to a given vector ∇F form a (hyper-)plane orthogonal to this
vector. It is known that all the vectors which are orthogonal to all the vectors from
this plane are collinear with ∇F, i.e., we must have ∇G = c · ∇F for some constant
c – or, equivalently, that ∇F = c′ · ∇G for some constant c′ = 1/c.
Let us use this conclusion to analyze our case study, in which we unknowns vi
are:
(0)

• the “objective” utility value ui of person i, and
• the utility values u j corresponding to all other persons j.

4 Case Study
Description of the case: reminder. We consider the case when the main objective
of the person i is increasing the GDP of his/her country.
In this case, the function G has the form (2).
Analysis of the case. For the function G, its gradient is equal to ∇G = (1, . . . , 1), so
the above condition means that
∇F = c′ · ∇G = (c′ , . . . , c′ )

(8)

for some constant c′ , i.e., that all partial derivatives of the function F have the same
value. It is convenient to describe F as F = exp(H), where
!
(0)

H = ln(F) = ln ui + ∑ αi j · u j + ∑ ln(u j ).
j̸=i

(9)

j̸=i

Here, by the chain rule formula, ∇F = exp(H)·∇H. So, all components of the vector
∇H differ from the corresponding components of the vector ∇F by the same factor
F = exp(H). Since all the components of the gradient ∇F are equal to each other,
this implies that all the components of the gradient ∇H are also equal to each other.
(0)
Differentiating the expression (9) with respect to ui , we conclude that
def

H,i =

∂H
(0)
∂ ui

=

1
(0)
ui +

.

∑ αi j · u j
j̸=i

For each k ̸= i, differentiating the expression (9) with respect to uk , we get:

(10)
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def

H,k =

∂H
αik
1
= (0)
+ .
∂ uk
ui + ∑ αi j · u j uk

(11)

j̸=i

These two derivative – i.e., these two components of the gradient – must be equal to
each other, i.e., we must have
αik
(0)
ui +

+

∑ αi j · u j
j̸=i

1
1
= (0)
.
uk
ui + ∑ αi j · u j

(12)

j̸=i

Multiplying both sides of this equation by
def (0)

C = ui + ∑ αi j · u j ,

(13)

j̸=i

we conclude that
αik +

C
= 1.
uk

(14)

Thus, we arrive at the following formula for the coefficients αik describing the i-th
person’s emotions towards others.
Resulting formula and its interpretation. For a person i whose main objective is
increasing the country’s GDP, the appropriate emotions towards others – namely,
the emotions that best promote this objective – are described by the formula
αik = 1 −

C
.
uk

(15)

Thus:
• When a person k works hard and contributes a lot to the GDP – and thus, get a
lot of compensation uk for his/her hard work, we get αik ≈ 1 – i.e., the person i
has a very positive attitude towards this hard-working person k.
• On the other hand, if a person k works as little as possible, so that k’s compensation is small, the i’s attitude towards k is much less positive, and it can be even
negative if uk < C.
Comments.
• From the commonsense viewpoint, this negative attitude makes sense: if i’s goal
is to increase the country’s GDP, then i naturally feels negative towards those
who could help their country more but prefer not to work too hard. What we
showed is that not only such motions are natural, they actually help achieve such
economic goals. For example, if many people think like that, the country may try
to force people to work more – e.g., by imposing special taxes on those who do
not pull their share of effort.
• It is important to take into account that we are dealing with an approximate model
and thus, our main conclusion – the formula (15) – should not be taken too liter-
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ally. For example, it is necessary to take into account that the formula (15) – and
the resulting negative attitude – only make sense towards people who could work
more but prefer not to. It does not make any economic sense to have negative
feelings towards people who try their best but cannot produce too much because
of their health or age or disability.
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